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REYNOLDS V. CITY OF CHICAGO,
296 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2002)
FACTS
Prior to 1960, black and white police officers in Chicago were
segregated, with black officers assigned to predominantly black sections of
the city.' During this period, the police department hired black officers in
proportion to the number of black residents in the city.2 Although the
commissioner eventually desegregated the department, discrimination
continued to occur, leading to a decline in the hiring of black officers.
Despite reforms instituted in the 1970s to rectify the effects of racial
discrimination, few black officers held senior positions within the
department by the 1980s.4  Additionally, the police department refused to
hire women for most positions until the 1970s.5
To remedy these discriminatory acts, the City enacted an affirmative
action plan under which the police department promoted blacks, Hispanics,
and women even if they scored lower than a white male on the promotion
test.6  In 1990 and 1991, the department promoted twenty officers in
accordance with this plan.7 Shortly afterward, plaintiffs, white Chicago
police sergeants and lieutenants, challenged these promotions by filing suit
against the City of Chicago, claiming a denial of their equal protection of the
laws.8 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
found in favor of the City with respect to the promotions of the black and
female officers. The court held for the plaintiffs regarding the promotion of
the Hispanic officer.9 Both parties appealed the decision. '0
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the judgment for the City with respect to the black and female officers."
The court reversed the judgment for the plaintiffs regarding the promotion of
1 Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2002).
2id.
'Id. at 527-28.4 Id. at 528.
3 1d.
6 Id. at 525-26.
7 Id. at 525, 528. The department promoted I I black sergeants and one Hispanic sergeant to lieutenant out
of 182 promotions of sergeants, three black lieutenants to captain out of 50 promotions of lieutenants, and
five women.
'Id. at 525.
9 Id. at 526.
10 Id.
11Id.
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the Hispanic officer.12 The court held that the evidence supported the jury's
findings that discrimination within the police department in the 1960s led to
a lack of black officers in senior positions in the 1980s 13 and that the City
refused to hire women until the 1970s.14  The court upheld the District
Court's determination that the City did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause by promoting black and female officers who had lower test scores. is
The court stated that remedying past discrimination is a valid justification for
affirmative action.16  Additionally, the court found that the City did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause by promoting the Hispanic officer
because the City had a compelling need to increase the amount of Hispanic
lieutenants.17  The court remanded the case with instructions to enter
judgment for the City of Chicago."
ANALYSIS
The court first addressed the plaintiffs' argument that an appellate
court must review a jury's finding of fact de novo in race discrimination
cases. 19 The plaintiffs claimed that a justification for racial discrimination
must be supported by "a strong basis in evidence., 20 The court explained
that under equal protection analysis, racial discrimination must be based on
proof, as opposed to argument or conjecture, of a compelling justification for
discrimination. 21 The court also noted that the fact finding duties of both the
trial and appellate court may differ.22 Nevertheless, the court concluded that
the jury's responsibility and the appellate standard of review remain the same
as with any other case. 23 The court stated that a clearly-erroneous standard
of review was appropriate for jury findings.24 Further, a reviewing court in
federal civil cases may owe more deference to a jury's finding than to a
12 Id. at 531.
3 d. at 528.14 id.
15 Id.
16 id.
i Id. at 529-30.
"Id. at 531.
'9 id. at 526.
20 Id.; see, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234,
1244 (11 th Cir. 2001).
21 Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 526 (7th Cir. 2002).
2Id. at 526-27.
21 Id. at 526.
24 Id. (citing Worth v. Tyler, 276 F.3d 249, 266 (7th Cir. 2001); Susan Wakeen Doll Co. v. Ashton Drake
Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 451 (7th Cir. 2001); All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. High Tech Staffing Serv.,
Inc., 135 F.3d 740, 749 (11th Cir. 1998); Tamez v. City of San Marcos, 118 F.3d 1085, 1094 (5th Cir.
1997); United States v. Tolliver, 116 F.3d 120, 125 (5th Cir. 1997)).
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judge's findings.25 Ultimately, the court decided that the appropriate
standard of review was a "general issue of judicial epistemology and was in
no way special to cases involving racial discrimination. 2 6 The court noted
that this issue did not need to be resolved in the case at hand.2
The court held that the jury's findings of fact concerning the
promotions of the black and female officers were neither clearly erroneous
nor unreasonable.28 The evidence showed that white officers harassed black
officers and that black officers failed the medical examination at a rate
suspiciously higher than that of white officers. 29 The court noted that this
supported a finding that discrimination in the department in the 1960s led to
a lack of black people in senior positions in the 1980s. 30 The court reasoned
that affirmative action is justified when it attempts to remedy past
discrimination. 3' The court agreed with the District Court's conclusion that
the City did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, noting that the City took
32only modest action. Similarly, the court upheld the decision in favor of the
City with respect to the promotions of the female officers, because the City
barred women from most jobs in the police department until the 1970S.
33
Next, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' contention that the City was
barred by judicial estoppel from defending its affirmative action
promotions.34 Judicial estoppel bars a party that has obtained a judgment
based on certain facts from obtaining a later judgment by proving
contradicting facts.35 The plaintiffs contended that the City could not argue
in favor of intentional discrimination because it had obtained a judgment in
36an earlier case, United States v. City of Chicago, based on a failure to find
25 Id. at 527; see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Pace, 320 U.S. 698, 701 (1944); Artis v. Hitachi Zosen
Clearing, Inc., 967 F.2d 1132, 1139 (7th Cir. 1992); Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226,
1235 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
26 Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2002).
27 Id.
28 Id.










16 United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 435 (7th Cir. 1977) (reversing the District Court's
finding of an equal protection violation by the City of Chicago). In City of Chicago, the City was charged
with discriminating against blacks in hiring officers for the police department, id. at 420, and the District
Court ruled that the City had violated equal protection. Id. at 435. While the case was on appeal, the
Supreme Court ruled that discrimination had to be intentional to violate equal protection. Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976). The Court of Appeals then reversed the District Court's finding of
an equal protection violation because the evidence did not support a finding of intentional discrimination.
City of Chicago, 549 F.2d at 435.
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intentional discrimination.37 In response, the court stated that there had been
no finding whatsoever regarding intentional discrimination in the earlier
case,38 and estoppel was therefore inappropriate.39
Finally, the court considered the City's alternative justification of the
promotions as a means of increasing the police department's effectiveness in
performing its duties.4 ° Because the court had already approved the remedial
grounds for the promotions of the black and female officers, it focused on the
alternative ground only with respect to the promotion of the Hispanic
officer.4' Statistics from 1990 showed that Hispanics represented twenty
percent of the City's population, but less than five percent of its police
lieutenants were Hispanic.42 The City justified the Hispanic officer's
promotion on two grounds: a Hispanic lieutenant would be more sensitized
to problems in Hispanic neighborhoods, thereby promoting a more sensitive
police force, and an increase in the number of Hispanic lieutenants would
improve the Hispanic community's trust of the police department.43 The
court pointed out that while non-remedial justifications of discrimination are
usually suspect, some courts have upheld discrimination that is based on
compelling public safety concems.44 The court further ruled that because
effective police work is a national priority, especially in a time of
international terrorism, the City proved that it had a compelling need to
discriminate by promoting Hispanic lieutenants.45
CONCLUSION
When courts analyze race-based classifications for equal protection
claims, they typically apply strict scrutiny, the highest standard of review.
Strict scrutiny analysis in Reynolds required the City to show that the
affirmative action policy was narrowly tailored to further a compelling state
interest. Without discussing it in much detail, the court applied the first
part of the analysis by relying on precedent stating that an affirmative action
37 id.





43 Id. at 529-30.
Id. at 530 (citing Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920-21 (7th Cir. 1996); Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863
F.2d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1988); Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 928-32 (4th Cir. 1981); Detroit
Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 695-96 (6th Cir. 1979)).
41Id. at 530-31.
46 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
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policy is justified if its purpose is to remedy past discrimination. 47  The
policy was narrowly tailored because the action was "modest. 48
Specifically, the court noted that "a mere handful" of officers were promoted
out of rank and no white officers lost their jobs because of the promotions;
instead their promotions merely were delayed.49
The Hispanic officer's promotion could not survive strict scrutiny
analysis on the same remedial basis, however, because the evidence did not
reveal a history of past discrimination against Hispanics by the police
department.5 0 Recognizing this, the court stated that the Supreme Court had
not spoken definitively on the issue of non-remedial justifications for
affirmative action.5 The court then found that the promotion served the
compelling state interest of public safety by increasing the department's
effectiveness in relating to the Hispanic community.52  Because the
department had promoted only one Hispanic sergeant on this basis, this
promotion also was narrowly tailored.
53
For gender classifications, courts apply an intermediate scrutiny
standard that requires the policy in question to be substantially related to an
important state interest.54 Without discussing intermediate scrutiny at all, the
court simply upheld the District Court's finding that there was no equal
protection violation due to the policy's purpose of remedying past
discrimination.55
For several decades, courts have dealt with cases of alleged "reverse
discrimination" in which white or male plaintiffs challenge affirmative action
programs, claiming a violation of their equal protection under the laws.
56
The backlash against affirmative action has grown steadily stronger over the
years, with two current Justices of the Supreme Court going as far as finding
race-based affirmative action of any sort unconstitutional.57 By joining other
circuits in expanding the non-remedial justifications for affirmative action,
47 See Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2002).
49 See id.
49 see id.
'o See id. at 529.
" See id. at 530.
52 See id.
3 see id.
34 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
55 See Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 528-29 (7th Cir. 2002).
6See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
57 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that
"government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to
Imake up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction"); id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that "government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as
discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice" because "[i]n each instance, it is racial discrimination,
plain and simple").
2003]
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the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took a bold step and
demonstrated its willingness to defer to the state legislature's expertise in
assessing the benefits of diversity. The legitimization of all the challenged
promotions in Reynolds is a positive sign that courts continue to recognize
the need for affirmative action.
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